JCA Refinement Meeting Out Brief

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Joint Staff J-7 / JETCD

http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/cap_areas.htm
https://jdeis.js.smil.mil/jdeis/jel/futurejointwarfare/cap_areas.htm

Agenda

- **Background**
- **JCA Data Call Issues**
- **Way Ahead**

JCA Time Line

May 06 Progress Rpt

QDR and SPG re-affirmed them…



May 06

Expanded FCB GO/FO Mtg
3 Apr 06

Apr

SPG
Mar 06

Mar **JCA OPR &**

JCA Refinement Mtg
15-16 Mar 06

Svc Coord Mtgs

Feb

QDR
6 Feb 06

Data Call Closed
24 Jan 06

Jan

QDR Taxonomy SWG gave 6 month progress report to IPT #5 SPIWG

Formal Planner-Level Data Ca
14 Dec 05

Dec

Refined Tier 1 & Working Tier 2 JCA Lexicon & Taxonomy delivered to IPT #5 SPIWG
31 Aug 05

Nov

JCAMP Development

Oct

CJCS refining them…

JCA Tier 1 & 2 GO/FO CRC
24-25 Aug 05

Sep


THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000
MAY 9 2005
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
COMMANDERS OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDS
DIRECTOR PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
SUBJECT: Operational Availability (OA)-05 / Joint Capability Areas
OSD 05820-05

Aug

Jul

Adjudication

Jun

JCA Tier 1 & 2 / Business Rules GO/FO Staffing
13 May 05

May 05

SecDef directed them…


OA-05 Recommendations
General:
4. CJCS continue to refine definitions for Tier 1 Joint Capability Areas and Tier 2 capability areas with
Strategic Planning Guidance
Fiscal Years 2006-2011
March 2004

OA-05 delivered them…

Aldridge Study
Dec 03

OSD asked for them…

Aldridge Study recommended them…

JCA Refinement Meeting

- **Purpose - Review and adjudicate Planner (0-6) level change recommendations to the JCA Lexicon and Taxonomy IAW the Joint Capability Area Management Plan (JCAMP)**

- **JCA data call yielded over 400 comments:**
  - **Tier 1 – 63 comments**
    - **18 critical**
    - **37 substantive**
  - **Tier 2 – 287 comments**
    - **43 critical**
    - **200 substantive**
  - **Usefulness of JCAs – 55 comments with several common threads**

JCA Refinement Meeting – Common Threads

- Need Department level JCA implementation plan
  - Must be directive nature as opposed to SecDef memo's "where appropriate" wording
  - Need to determine lead author…OSD (or JCS) …but both must be involved
  - Must integrate DoD processes – "How are others using JCAs?"
- JCAMP needs refinement to enhance JCAs' usefulness
- Three comments to change JCA construct

CBP Strategic Direction – 2006 QDR & SPG

- Reaffirms Department's shift to Capabilities-Based Planning
- Emphasizes the need to manage the Department via joint capability portfolios to meet President and Combatant Commanders' needs
- Links JCAs to joint capability portfolio concept
  - Initial effort includes Joint C2, Joint Net Centric Operations, Joint Battlespace Awareness & Joint Logistics
- The Department will break out its budget according to JCAs
- Lauds PACOM's efforts (Linking Plans to Resources) to map resource needs to plans and operations

JCA Refinement Meeting – Rules of Engagement

- **Tier 1 – SecDef approved; minor adjustments considered, no major changes can be made at this forum**
- **Tier 2 – CJCS developed (work in progress); all comments considered, burden of proof on comment author**
- **OPRs will out brief all critical comments, un-resolved substantive comments, and other decisions with wide-ranging impact**
- **JCA Coordinator may elevate issues to the next higher level until a resolution in achieved. Forum for resolution is issue dependent**

Joint Land Operations

Critical Comments

Received	Resolved	Unresolved
1	1	0

Joint Maritime/Littoral Operations

Critical Comments

Received	Resolved	Unresolved
0	0	0

Joint Air Operations

Critical Comments

Received	Resolved	Unresolved
0	0	0

Joint Space Operations

Critical Comments

Received	Resolved	Unresolved
4	4	0

Joint Access & Access Denial

Critical Comments

Received	Resolved	Unresolved
0	0	0

Joint Information Operations

Critical Comments

Received	Resolved	Unresolved
3	3	0

Joint Stability Operations

Critical Comments

Received	Resolved	Unresolved
6	6	0

JStO – FA FCB

Tier 1 – Comments 1, 2

Critical / Army, JFCOM

Recommendation: Change title from "Joint Stability Operations" to "Military Support to Stability Operations". And change lexicon and taxonomy of the Joint Stability Operations JCA to be consistent with NSPD 44 and DoDD 3000.05

Rationale: Consistency and correctness with latest Presidential and SecDef guidance and policy. It is important for JCAs to mirror both the lexicon and intent of guidance established by the President and the SecDef

Pros / Cons

Pros: Definition/description would be consi with DoDD 3000.5 and CJCS Notice xxx language

Cons: None

JCA OPR Comment – Accept

Title and description will be changed to to be consistent with NSPD the DoDD and the CJCS Notice (draft). Which accurately reflected would be - "Stability Operations: Military support to Stability, Security, transition and reconstruction (SSTR)".

Follow-on

None

Joint Special Operations and Irregular Operations

Critical Comments

Received	Resolved	Unresolved
10	9	* 1

JSOIO – FA FCB

Tier 1 – Comments 12, 14

Critical / SOCOM

Recommendation: Change the Tier 1 name of Joint Irregular Operations to "Joint Irregular Warfare".

Rationale: The term "Warfare" is more appropriate in describing this Tier 1 activity. Joint Irregular Warfare, rather than Irregular Operations better serves as the overarching and encompassing term for the Tier 2 operations and activities reflected in the JCA Taxonomy

Pros / Cons

Pros:

- Supports ASD SO/LIC (Draft) Directive
- Supports QDR directed Irregular Warfare Execution Roadmap terminology

Cons: Changes currently approved Tier 1 name

JCA OPR Position – Accept

- Irregular Warfare meets ASD SO/LIC (Draft) Directive intent and definition
- QDR language expresses capabilities, risk and end-states achieved using the terms Special Operations and Irregular Warfare.
- SPG (Draft) employs the term Irregular Warfare to denote and describe top priorities

Follow-on

None

JSOIO – FA FCB

Tier 1 – Comment 15

Critical / Navy

Recommendation: Delete "& Irregular Ops" from the Tier 1 title "Jt Special Ops and Irregular Ops", and delete "Irregular Warfare" as a Tier 2 JCA

Rationale: Irregular Ops/Irregular Warfare are overarching concepts that involve broad applications of DoD resources across multiple Tier 1 JCAs.

Pros / Cons

Pros: (OPNAV N8) Irregular Ops/Irregular Warfare are overarching concepts that involve broad applications of DoD resources across multiple Tier 1 JCAs.

Cons: Does not facilitate desired JCA specific capabilities-based planning, major trade analysis, and decision-making nor does it allow for a sufficient identification of required capabilities.

JCA OPR Position – Reject

- Irregular Warfare meets ASD SO/LIC (Draft) Directive intent and definition
- QDR language expresses capabilities, risk and end-states achieved using the terms Special Operations and Irregular Warfare
- SPG (Draft) employs the term Irregular Warfare to denote and describe top priorities

Follow-on

Unresolved, requires Flag/SES level adjudication

JSOIO – FA FCB

Tier 2 – Comment 2, 3

Critical / SOCOM

Recommendation: Change Tier 2s to reflect a line and block chart for Special Operations and another for Irregular Warfare.

Rationale: The recommendation to show a separate Tier 2 for Special Operations and Irregular Warfare allows for a distinction between the two Tier 2s and better clarifies the use of Tier 3 JCAs that are more descriptive of the respective Tier 2 capability areas.

Pros / Cons

Pros: Provides clarity in linking joint/Service war fight requirements (Tier 2 & 3) with joint/Service resources (Tier 2 & 3)

Cons: None

JCA OPR Position – Accept

- Recommendation provides sufficient definitions, and relationship construct, at Tier 1, 2 & 3 levels required to enable identification of desired capabilities – both the capabilities required by the GCCs and the capabilities provided by the Services/SOCOM

Follow-on

None

JSOIO – FA FCB

Tier 2 – Comment 8

Substantive / Navy

Recommendation: PSYOP should be moved back under IO as a blue box (retain in Spec Ops as a white box).

Rationale: IAW JP 3-13. Although SOCOM is tasked with the mission, PSYOP capabilities still reside with the services. PSYOP is a core capability of IO.

Pros / Cons

Pros: None

Cons:

- Changes decision of August GO/FO conf.
- Does not improve JCA Lexicon or Taxonomy
- Does not improve process or employment of PSYOP as a Tier 2, 3, or lower

JCA OPR Position – Reject

- PSYOP is a fundamental Tier 3 element of both Spec Ops (Blue Box) and Irregular Warfare (White Box) – <u>It does not prohibit</u> any other JCA to employ PSYOP as a supporting capability White Box.
- PSYOP may be executed by multiple Services, in multiple domains and as a supporting effort of multiple Operations; however, as a core

Follow-on

Unresolved, requires Flag/SES level adjudication

Joint Global Deterrence

Critical Comments

Received	Resolved	Unresolved
1	0	1

JGD – FA FCB

Tier 1 – Comment 20

Critical / Army

Recommendation: Create a new Tier 1 JCA "Joint Force Projection"
- Strategic Airlift
- Strategic Sealift
- Intra-theater Airlift
- Intra-theater Sealift

Rationale: JFP is strategically and operationally critical for achievement of many JOpsC family of concepts key ideas

Pros / Cons

Pros: Transformational joint force projection capabilities are critical for future joint force to deploy/employ directly from CONUS or long-range ISBs into JOA to seize initiative, confront enemy with multiple dilemmas and accelerate defeat

Cons:
- Duplicative with Joint Logistics JCA
- Conflicts with ground rules regarding Tier 1 JCA changes for this refinement effort

JCA OPR Position – Reject

- Creates a whole new Tier 1
- Force Projection as it relates to JGD is already defined as a Tier 2 capability
- Duplicates many of capabilities identified under Joint Logistics JCA
  - Joint Deployment/Rapid Distribution
  - Agile Sustainment

Follow-on

Unresolved, requires Flag/SES level adjudication

Defense Support to Civil Authorities

Critical Comments

Received	Resolved	Unresolved
1	1	0

Joint Homeland Defense

Critical Comments

Received	Resolved	Unresolved
0	0	0

Joint Protection

Critical Comments

Received	Resolved	Unresolved
1	1	0

Joint Net-Centric Operations

Critical Comments

Received	Resolved	Unresolved
5	5	0

Joint Logistics

Critical Comments

Received	Resolved	Unresolved
0	0	0

Joint Battlespace Awareness

Critical Comments

Received	Resolved	Unresolved
8	7	1

JBA – BA FCB

Tier 2 – Comment 170

Critical / Navy

Battlespace Awareness Tier 2s must include blue and white force tracking/SA

Recommendation: Jt BA must be expanded to include the full scope of true battlespace awareness (red/white/blue). In some cases this may require additional Tier 2s, but in many cases it just means expanding definitions to NOT limit themselves to red or red/white info/data.

Rationale: Any operational commander needs complete SA; any operational COP needs to display a complete picture. An accurate representation MUST include blue/red/& white data. This concept was recently endorsed by JROCM 276-05 dated 22 December 2005. One of several points contained in this JROC-endorsed attachment to this JROCM provides an example, by stating that "BFT, JBFSA, and CID [which all support JF S.A.] are not identical but interrelated and cannot be separated."

Pros / Cons

Pros:

- "Battlespace Awareness" implies complete situational awareness (blue/white/red/gray) in support of commanders and systems

Cons:

- Current alignment indicating JBA in supporting/integrating role allows operational separation of blue/red force tracking issues for command and control
- Topic of Blue Force Tracking addressed during JCA Conference in 2005 and participants agreed with JC2 alignment

JCA OPR Position – Reject

Refer to JC2 as appropriate owner of Blue Force Tracking capability

Follow-on

Unresolved, requires Flag/SES level adjudication

Joint Command & Control

Critical Comments

Received	Resolved	Unresolved
5	4	1

JC2 – C2 FCB

Tier 2 – Comments 126, 109, 129,130, 131, 132, 134

Critical / JS J8

Recommendation: Standardize the definition of planning. Planning should remain under JFM Tier 1, (white box to C2, BA, etc.)

Rationale: Term planning is used in three places (JFM, JC2 and JBA)within the JCA Lexicon and the definitions listed after the terms are all different.

Pros / Cons

Pros: Would consolidate planning under JFM Tier 1.

Cons: Does not align with guidance for JC2 Planning as stated in:

- DoD 5100.30 Joint and Global C2 Definitions
- C2 Functional Concept, C2 JIC, C2 CBA ongoing effort

JCA Recommendation – Defer

C2 FCB position is that planning is an inherent C2 capability, as it is with force management and battlespace awareness. C2 FCB recommends maintaining planning as C2 JCA Tier 2 and modify term to illustrate difference. (e.g. Operational Planning.) Recommend further differentiating planning among other JCAs within the

Follow-on

Unresolved, requires Flag/SES level adjudication

Joint Public Affairs Operations

Critical Comments

Received	Resolved	Unresolved
5	4	1

JPAO JS – FM FCB Tier 2 – Comments #144, 161, 154

Critical / JFCOM (Rename Tier 2) Substantive / Navy (Delete Tier 2)

Recommendation: #144 - Replace entire definition for “Strategic Information and Engagement Coordination” with the QDR definition for “Strategic Communication” #161 - Replace “Strategic Information and Engagement Coordination” white block with “Strategic communication” white block.

Rational: The QDR definition of Strategic Communication is more encompassing and succinct. (See lexicon comment for Strategic Communication definition.)

Pros / Cons

Pros:

- Strategic Information and Engagement Coordination is a process, not a capability.
- Capability to engage in the process of coordination and deconfliction should already be resident in existing Tier 1 & 2 capabilities, i.e. IPA, IO, DSPD, etc.

Cons:

- Joint Shaping supports inclusion of “Strategic Information and Engagement Coordination” as a Tier 2 capability.

JCA OPR Position – Defer

- Non-concur with comments #144 and #161
- Concur with Navy substantive comment #154 to delete “Strategic Information and Engagement Coordination” as a Tier 2 capability
- Adjudicated at JCA Refinement Conference to defer resolution based on Strategic

Follow-on

Unresolved, requires Flag/SES level adjudication

Joint Shaping

Critical Comments

Received	Resolved	Unresolved
3	2	1

JS – FM FCB

Tier 2 – Comment 153

Critical / Navy

Recommendation: Designate DSPD as a Tier 2 JCA supported by the Tier 1 Joint Public Affairs Operations JCA vice Tier 1 Joint Shaping JCA.

Rationale: DSPD describes the role component PAOs perform in support of DoS overseas. Specifically, PA tasks such as communication planning ISO U.S. foreign policy, coordination of themes and messages, press conferences/interviews/backgrounders with foreign officials and foreign press, overseas community relations programs, foreign media analysis, placement of opinion pieces in foreign press, countering of misinformation and coordination of visual information activities are examples of direct support of the DoS public diplomacy mission.

Pros / Cons

Pros: None

Cons: Although PA plays a major role in DSPD, it is not the only contributor to DSPD. IO also adds significantly to DSPD (Theater Security Cooperation Plans, Military Information Support Teams) as well as Military Diplomacy.

JCA OPR Position – Reject

- DSPD encompasses more than PA. IO and Military Diplomacy are also critical to DSPD's success and essential in its execution. DSPD is major component to Joint Shaping
- The appropriate location for DSPD is under the Joint Shaping Tier I JCA

Follow-on

Unresolved, requires Flag/SES level adjudication

Joint Force Management

Critical Comments

Received	Resolved	Unresolved
6	6	* 0

JFM – FM FCB

Tier 2 – Comments 133, 137, 139

Substantive / JS J8

Recommendation: Delete "Future Capability Identification" from this JCA.

Rationale: Unless we plan for the FM FCB to take charge of all concept development; all CBAs etc. this task remains a subset of each JCA, e.g., the organization responsible for Homeland Defense will identify capabilities required to improve the joint forces ability to protect the homeland.

Pros / Cons

Pros: The purpose of the JCIDS process, and by extension, the FCBs, is to identifying, assessing, and prioritizing joint military capability needs.

Cons: May lose 'forcing function' to push process to look at future capability needs.

JCA OPR Position – Accept

Agree with rationale provided. Each JCA has the responsibility to identify capabilities within their purview to meet future requirements.

Follow-on

Unresolved, requires Flag/SES level adjudication

Joint Force Generation

Critical Comments

Received	Resolved	Unresolved
4	4	* 0

JFG– JT FCB

Tier 2 – Comment 109

Substantive / Navy

Recommendation: Tier 2 JCA structures for JFG and JFM are too broad to be useful. More fidelity is required if they are to be used to operational, analytical, or programmatic purposes. If the desire is to retain these JCAs, their Tier 2 structures must be fleshed out to provide more clarity and greater fidelity. "Planning" roles need to be deconflicted between JFM and JT C2.

Rationale: Navy is preparing their Integrated Capabilities Plan (ICP), which is the basis for POM development, utilizing JCAs…except JFG & JFM. Because JFG & JFM lacked sufficient fidelity, Navy is assessing these areas using prior-existing N1/N4 manpower & readiness categorizations instead.

Pros / Cons

Pros: Increased fidelity may improve ability to integrate and implement JCA more appropriately.

Cons: Takes JCA away from macro DOD level

JCA OPR Position – Defer

JFG is a "build the force" JCA meant to provide trained forces and equipment to JFM who are the "manage the force" JCA and provide tailored forces and equipment to the other JCAs. JCAs were designed as a common language to be used across DOD as a whole, which drives definitions and structures to be more generic vice specific and sometimes results in a "grey area" between JFG, JFM, other JCAs, and Services.

Follow-on

Unresolved, requires shift in scope

Plan Working Groups with COI and formal staffing as appropriate to refocus Tiers on Joint Force vice entire DOD force

Joint Interagency / IGO / NGO Coordination

Critical Comments

Received	Resolved	Unresolved
4	4	0

JIINC – JT FCB

Tier 1 – Comment 47

Critical / Air Force

Recommendation: Change title and description to read: **“**Joint Interagency/IGO/NGO/Multinational Coordination. The ability to … coordinate … and engage engaged U.S. Government agencies, intergovernmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations, and multinational entities (e.g., partnership states) for the purpose of accomplishing an objective.

Rationale: Clarity and to correct omissions.

Pros / Cons

Pros: Adds omissions

Cons: Does not help clarify definition

JCA OPR Position – Accept

Follow-on

None

General Comments

All

Tier 2 – Comment 282

Critical / Navy

Recommendation: 1 - Review all JCAs to ensure they meet SECDEF/Tank-approved Tier 1 & 2 critieria/definitions. Revise Jt C2, JFG, & JFM structures with an eye towards identifying JCAs that can be delegated, executed, analyzed, or specifically supported by DoD systems & programs. 2 - JICs should follow JCAs, not vice versa. 3 - Consolidate all the operational art and leadership elements currently in C2 into 2-3 white Jt C2 Tier 2 boxes, which would appear as blue Tier 2 boxes in JFG.
Rationale: See notes pages

Pros / Cons

Pros: None

Cons: None

CA Coordinator Position – Partially Accept

1 - All JCAs are currently being reviewed using the JCAMP refinement process to include JC2, JFG, and JFM.
2 - concur… some reverse engineering occurred during initial JCA development …the JCAMP refinement process should correct inconsistencies.
3 - See specific JCA OPR comments on this

Follow-on

None

SecDef JCA Memo

"Although I recognize this lexicon needs further development, I encourage you to begin using the Joint Capability Areas where appropriate. The attached action items address specific taskers…The CJCS shall…"

- **Refine Tier 2 layer of capabilities lexicon as required to provide sufficient detail to enhance usefulness**
- **Implement the JCAs (Tier 1) as the top level in the evolving capabilities lexicon. Establish a subsequent date (NLT March 2006) for formal review after sufficient use**
- **Develop joint definitions for all JCA terms and transition to joint doctrine as they are refined**
- **Embed JCAs into future guidance for JOCs, JICs, and JFCs**
- **In coordination with JSJFCOM, Integrate the capabilities lexicon into the future Universal Joint Task List (UJTL)**
- **Use the capabilities lexicon in the continued evolution of the Joint Capabilities Integration**



JCS

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MAY 6 2005

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UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
COMMANDERS OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDS
DIRECTOR PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION

SUBJECT: Operational Availability (OA)-05 / Joint Capability Areas

Thank you for your participation in the Joint Force Capabilities Assessment sub-study under Operational Availability-05. Your input and comments during the study clearly enhanced the outcome of this important effort.

As an integral part of the evolving Capabilities-Based Planning process, and in response to guidance in the Strategic Planning Guidance, the study developed 21 Joint Capability Areas representing the beginnings of a common language to discuss and describe capabilities across many related Department activities and processes.

Although I recognize this lexicon needs further development, I encourage you to begin using the Joint Capability Areas where appropriate. The attached action items address specific taskers. A copy of the briefing is included for your information.

Attachments:
As stated

OSD 05820-05

SecDef JCA Memo



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
CBP
JCA Refinement
UJTLs
PPBES
GFM/ JFP
JCIDS
Policy
Doctrine
AT&L
CDE
JCA Management Plan
Tier 1 JCAs / Assigned OPRs
Joint Force Generation (JT FCB)
Joint Force Management (FM FCB)
Joint Battlespace Awareness (BA FCB)
Joint C2 (C2 FCB)
Joint Net-Centric Operations (NC FCB)
Joint Public Affairs Operations (FM FCB)
Joint Interagency / IGO/ NGO/ Coordination (JT FCB)
Joint Protection (FP FCB)
Joint Logistics (FL FCB)
Joint Homeland Defense (FP FCB)
Defense Support of Civil Authorities (FP FCB)
Joint Global Deterrence (FA FCB)
Joint Shaping (FM FCB)
Joint Stability Operations (FA FCB)
Joint Information Operations (FA FCB)
Joint Access & Access Denial (FA FCB)
Joint Special Operations & Irregular Operations (FA FCB)
Joint Land Operations (FA FCB)
Joint Maritime /Littoral Operations (FA FCB)
Joint Air Operations (FA FCB)
Joint Space Operations (FA FCB)
Tier 1 JCAs further decomposed to a set of 230 + Tier 2 JCAs that are defined and binned appropriately to highlight the supported/supporting relationships
UNCLASSIFIED
5

How Can JCAs Best Facilitate CBP?

Way Ahead

- 7 Mar – JCA refinement meeting pre-brief to 06 FCB integration meeting
- 15/16 Mar – JCA refinement meeting
- 3 Apr – Expanded FCB GO/FO/SES integration meeting
- Apr – Prepare May 06 progress report to meet SecDef action item
  - Re-convene JCAMP Writing Team
- Apr/May – Vet progress report with JCB, Ops Deps, JROC, JCS as appropriate
- May – Deliver progress report to SecDef

Backup Slides

JFM – FM FCB Planning Definitions

JFM – Planning: The ability to create and revise plans rapidly and systematically, as circumstances require; occurs in a networked, collaborative environment, requires the regular involvement of senior DoD leaders, and results in plans containing a range of viable options. (Adaptive Planning Roadmap v1.1)

BA – Planning & Direction: The ability to develop intelligence requirements, coordinate and position the appropriate collection assets, from the national to the tactical level, to ensure robust situational awareness and knowledge of intended domains is gained. (JCA CRC – 28 Apr 05; modified from JP 2-01)

JC2 – Plan Collaboratively: The ability to plan utilizing an effects-based approach that directly ties offensive actions to campaign objectives, drawing on global resources and considering global consequences. Planning must be conducted with the collective knowledge of the decisions and plans of others to produce coherent integration. Planners must be able to focus on exploiting critical capabilities and potential collateral damage. Parallel, distributed, collaborative planning capabilities and improved assessment tools are needed to compress process timelines. However, collaboration does not imply decision making by committee or

Irregular Warfare

Is the proposed new taxonomy consistent with QDR?

QDR Force Planning Construct



Proposed JCA taxonomy revision



Proposed construct is inconsistent w/QDR. Irregular Warfare is an overarching concept (like MCO, GWOT, etc.) with multiple supporting Tier 1 JCAs.

Battlespace Awareness
A current JROC issue



- Battlespace Awareness is not just intel. The JFC requires *total situational awareness*.
- This *operational* perspective better fits the overarching JCA construct and *eliminates seams*

Operational commanders require total situational awareness (BA), shared via Net-Centric connections, displayed via C2 systems, to support operational Command & Control

JFP = Operational Maneuver from Strategic Distances



Irregular

- Bolster resolve of friends and allies
- Influence/change adversary's strategic options & planning
- Seize, secure, and render safe WMD
- Deter proliferation
- Enable operational and tactical surprise
- Preclude red from denying access denial
- Hold key WMD capabilities and resources at risk

Catastrophic

- Rapid projection of modular, scalable combined arms formations
- Mission-tailored force packages bypass ISBs where possible
- Advanced lift platforms not dependent on improved ports / airfields
- Link strategic force projection to operational campaign agility
- Deploy to Employ; early transition to decisive operations

Traditional

Disruptive

Why Joint Force Projection Should Be a Tier 1 JCA

Overarching Rationale:

Effective JFP is a fundamental and indispensable prerequisite to the successful employment of US military power globally.

JFP is strategically and operationally critical to meet current joint force
commander requirements for prompt and sustained response, fully synchronized to enable achievement of key operational tasks . . . .

. . . .and also critical to achieve many of the expeditionary goals projected in the CCJO and other joint concepts.

Why Joint Force Projection Should Be a Tier 1 JCA

Supporting Points

1. It is argued that JFP is duplicative of the JL JCA-- an inappropriate perspective
   - JFP should be viewed as essentially ***operational*** in character
   - JFP is a critical, synchronized component of the joint campaign plan
     - FDOs, early/forcible entry opns, sustained deployment for decisive opns
   - Joint force commander's perspective is paramount
     - JFC thinks in terms of ***rapidly employable force packages*** . . . not ton-miles, stow factors, or numbers of containers

2. Relegating JFP to a Tier 2 status under JGD minimizes its broad significance.
   - True . . the capability to project forces contributes to deterrence.
   - But, more importantly, JFP is a foundational capability for US Armed Forces to be able to act anywhere in the world for any purpose.
   - As the US continues to pull back globally from its forward positioning and deliberately adopts an expeditionary posture . . . facing challenges to access, JFP has become even more important.

3. Some of the most important capabilities and programs in progress or under consideration for development best fall under JFP:

JLO – FA FCB

Tier 1 – Comment 7

Critical / Army

Recommendation: Change definition of Joint Land Operations to the more comprehensive definition provided

Rationale: A more comprehensive definition is required in order to ensure the Tier 2 JLO joint capability areas can be properly nested within the definition of JLO.

Pros / Cons

Pros: More comprehensive definition allows for the better traceability of subordinate JCAs

Cons: Definition as provided changes GO/FO approved subordinate tier twos

JCA OPR Position – Partially Accept

Recommendation has support for more comprehensive definition - rewrote definition using the “best” from the approved lexicon, TRADOC’s proposal, and JP1-02 (see attached)

Follow-on

None

JLO – FA FCB

Tier 1 – Comment 7

Proposed definition

The ability to employ joint forces to achieve military objectives within the Land Domain. Such operations include offensive operations, defensive operations, and/or stability operations. Joint Land operations will require the Regional Component Commander (RCC) to employ joint forces to engage adversaries across the spectrum of traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive challenges. They are conducted as part of a campaign or major joint operation and extend across the full range of military joint operations (ROMO). Joint land operations can include operational maneuver from strategic and operational distances to directly attack centers of gravity in order to achieve the joint force commander's desired objectives. Close combat is a fundamental capability for successful joint land operations across the greater part of the ROMO. Joint Land Operations can include maneuver and engagement in order to destroy opposing forces, secure key terrain, control vital lines of communications, or to establish local or regional military superiority. Ultimately, Joint Land Operations seek to control territory, populations, and resources, which may require a long term commitment, in order to

JSpO – FA FCB

Tier 1 – Comments 8-11, 18

Critical / STRATCOM Substantive / JS J6, OSD AT&L

Recommendation: Change the Joint Space Operations JCA definition/ composition / eliminate notes.

Rationale: Matches lexicon with the well recognized, well documented, and well accepted description of Joint Space Operations that is contained in JP 3-14.

Pros / Cons

Pros: Matches JCA to JP 3-14

Cons:

- Current JSpO JCA composition is a compromise of 21 critical comments. STRATCOM's comments run counter to multiparty agreement. Other agencies comments also undermine agreement.
- Stovepipes space operations. Impacts other domain JCAs -- precedent for binning functions done in domain vs. capabilities.

JCA OPR Position – Reject

- JCA compromise was made between the USAF, USN, USMC, OSD (Space Policy) and USSTRATCOM/J8 and it stated the product would map JP 3-14 mission areas in the words, but place capabilities in the proper bin (e.g. ISR capabilities in Battlespace Awareness). In the JCA Lexicon, the NOTES accomplish this function.

Follow-on

None

JSpO – FA FCB

Tier 2 – Comments 22-24, 27-30

Critical / STRATCOM Substantive / JS J6

Recommendation: Change the Joint Space Operations JCA definition/ composition / eliminate notes.

Rationale: Matches lexicon with the well recognized, well documented, and well accepted description of Joint Space Operations that is contained in JP 3-14.

Pros / Cons

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Cons:

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Follow-on

None

JInO – FA FCB

Tier 1 – Comment 19

Critical / JFCOM

Recommendation: In the JCA lexicon, add Public Affairs (PA) as an explicitly mentioned Related Capability along with Civil-Military Operations and Defense Support to Public Diplomacy

Rationale: PA is a capability closely related to IO. Mentioning it explicitly will highlight that communication objectives and tactics must be deconflicted and help to ensure the two efforts are not working at cross purposes.

Pros / Cons

Pros:

- Relationship between IO and PA is a sensitive issue: any measure to help ensure coordination & deconfliction is worth considering
- If any supporting capability is to be mentioned, PA has strongest case

Cons: None

JCA OPR Comment – Accept

Adding PA to the lexicon; however, it will not be reflected in the taxonomy, because showing one Tier 1 as subordinate to another Tier 1 violates rule set.

Follow-on

None

JInO – FA FCB

Tier 2 – Comments 31, 32

Critical / ASD (NII), JS J6

Recommendation: Delete Computer Network Defense (CND) from the Joint Info Ops JCA (or make it a supporting capability) and add it as a primary tier 3 capability under Net-Centric Ops/Information Assurance

Rationale: Numerous DoD documents show CND as a sub-set of information assurance, including DoDD 8500.1, DoDD 5144.1, Net Ops CONOPs, and JP 6.0.

Pros / Cons

Pros:

- Provides better framework for capabilities-based planning, major trade analysis, and decision-making
- Consistent with DoD 8500 and GIG IA CONOPS

Cons:

- Contrary to JP 3-13 and Information Operations Roadmap
- Fails to consider distinctions between operational defense and technical management of the GIG (J3 vs. J6 roles)

CA OPR Position – Partially Accept

Both pros and cons have merit. Without a clearer understanding of how JCAs are going to be used, it is difficult to assess the implications of accepting the change. Compromise: Add CND as supporting tier 3 capability under JNCO/IA. Keep as primary tier 3 capability under JInO/CNO.

Follow-on

None

JStO – FA FCB

Tier 2 – Comment 12

Critical / Army

Recommendation: Change Tier 2 JCAs to align with DoDD 3000.05 paragraph 4.3 tasks of **Rebuilding indigenous institutions, Revive or rebuild the private sector, Develop representative governmental institutions.**

Rationale: Consistency and correctness with NSPD and DoDD. Important for JCAs to mirror both language and intent of Presidential and SecDef guidance.

Pros / Cons

Pros: None

Cons: None

JCA OPR Position – Partially Accept

The current Tier 2 JCAs are consistent with the DODD 3000.05. The **Restoration** Tier 2 JCA captures the tasks mentioned identified.

Definition in notes page.

Follow-on

None

JStO – FA FCB

Tier 2 – Comment 13

Critical / ASD (NII)

Recommendation: Basic Services Restoration Lexicon
Include **power** and **communications** in the listing of critical infrastructure that has to be established or reestablished.

Rationale: Consistency with NSPD-44, DoDD 3000.05, and JP 3-08. Power and communications infrastructure are required for the coordination and provision of all other emergency response services

Pros / Cons

Pros: Identifies additional critical infrastru
Areas that must be addressed

Cons: None

JCA OPR Comment – Accept

Stab Ops JCA should be consistent with NSPD-44 and DoDD 3000.05

Follow-on

None

JStO – FA FCB

Tier 2 – Comment 14

Critical / JFCOM

Recommendation: Under "US Government Interagency Integration" include Tier 2b boxes for "Intergovernmental Organization Coordination" (JIINC) and Non governmental Organization Coordination" (JIINC)

Rationale: DoDD 3000.05 cite Joint Interagency/IGO/NGO Coordination. IGO and NGO pieces are missing

Pros / Cons

Pros: Gives visibility to ALL Tier 2 JCAs for t Tier 1 JIINC JCA

Cons: Adds to the hierarchical complexity – subsumes all of the JIINC JCA under Stab Ops

JCA OPR Comment – Reject

- Under the Joint Interagency / IGO/NGO Coordination Tier 1 JCA the cited Tier 2 JCAs are equal in hierarchy. All of JIINC JCA would be incorporated . Tier 1 JCAs can and do support other Tier 1 JCAs

- If the identified Tier 2 JCA is correctly accomplished, it should identify actions required for the other

Follow-on

None

JStO – FA FCB

Tier 2 – Comment 15

Critical / ASD (NII)

Recommendation: Reconstruction Lexicon
Include **power** and **communications** in the example listing of critical systems and infrastructure

Rationale: Consistency with NSPD-44, DoDD 3000.05, and JP 3-08. Power and communications infrastructure are required for the coordination and provision of all other emergency response services

Pros / Cons

Pros: Identifies additional critical infrastruc
Areas that must be addressed

Cons: None

JCA OPR Comment – Accept

Stab Ops JCA should be consistent with NSPD-44 and DoDD 3000.05

Follow-on

None

JSOIO – FA FCB

Tier 1 – Comments 13, 14

Critical / SOCOM

Recommendation: Replace the current Tier 1 lexicon information with the following: “The ability to conduct operations that apply or counter means other than direct, traditional forms of combat involving peer-to-peer fighting between the regular armed forces of two or more countries.”

Rationale: Currently, there exist no co-definition/lexicon to surmise both of the Tier 1 titles. This recommended definition attempts to collate these two Tier 1s into one capability area.

Pros / Cons

Pros:

- Provides current working definition
- Provides basis for further refinement of definition when informed by QDR, SPG and IW Roadmap development

Cons: None

JCA OPR Position – Accept

- Recommended JtSO/IW Tier 1 definition (above) meets ASD SO/LIC’s Irregular Warfare (Draft) Directive intent and definition
- Closely aligned with the QDR directed IW Execution Roadmap’s emerging definition of Irregular Warfare

Follow-on

None

JSOIO – FA FCB

Tier 2 – Comment 1

Critical / Army

Recommendation: Delete "information operations" and "stability operations" from discussion/definition of "Joint Irregular Operations/Warfare".

Rationale: Joint Information Operations and Joint Stability Operations are stand-alone Tier 1 JCAs. As such, they are not to be listed as a subordinate capability to another Tier 1 JCA.

Pros / Cons

Pros: Complies with JCA Management Plan

Cons: None

JCA OPR Position – Accept

- IO and Stab Ops will <u>not</u> be reflected within the Taxonomy charts of JSO/IW Tier 3 capabilities, <u>but</u> may be referenced as inherent joint warfighting requirements derived from joint/Service resources needed to support the overarching JCA within the Lexicon.

Follow-on

None

JSOIO – FA FCB

Tier 2 – Comments 4, 5

Critical / SOCOM

Recommendation: Change the Taxonomy for Special Operations to reflect the following Tier 3s:

- Special Reconnaissance (Blue Box)
- Direct Action (Blue Box)
- Counterterrorism (Blue Box)
- Counterproliferation (J) (White Box)
- Unconventional Warfare (Blue Box)
- Foreign Internal Defense (IW) (White Box)
- Civil-Military Operations (Blue Box)
- Psychological Operations (Blue Box)

Rationale: The above Tier 3s are best represented as Special Operations' Core Tasks. These tasks are in accordance with JP 3-05.

Pros / Cons

Pros: Reflects doctrine with appropriate linkage to Taxonomy and Lexicon

Cons: None

JCA OPR Position – Accept

Follow-on

None

DSCA – FP FCB

Tier 1 – Comment 33

Critical / Army

Recommendation: Definition of the term Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) is not definitive and allows the use of Civil Support in its place.

Pros / Cons

Pros: Identifies need to clarify the use of te

Cons: Current lexicon is consistent with Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support.

JCA OPR Position – Reject

Reference for current definition is the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support (Jun 05). Coordinated with NORTHCOM/ARMY/JSJ5. Submitter concurs.

Follow-on

All agree that changes should be held pending more definitive progress in the current DoD HLD and CS JOC. Review results of the HD and CS JOC once complete.

JP – FP FCB Tier 1 –23-25; Tier 2 – 230, 240

Substantive / CENTCOM, JS J5

Recommendations:
1. Move Combating WMD from under JP to Tier 1
2. Add CWMD mission areas for new Tier 1
3. Change “Protect Against WMD Threat” to “Combating WMD” as a Tier 1

Rationale: Combating WMD is a top priority for the President and SecDef. Additionally, the lack of a combating WMD focal point for policy and capability development has emerged as a significant issue within QDR.

Pros / Cons

Pros: Makes CWMD more visible graphically

Cons:

- 21 Tier 1 JCAs approved by two GO/FO reviews and by Sec Def
- Tier 2 does not subjugate area – See definition of Tier 2

JCA OPR Position – Partially Accept

- Concur with adding Mission Areas IAW 13 Feb 06 NMS-CWMD
- FCB GO/FOs & Sec Def approved Tier 1s
- No compelling reason to separate CWMD

Follow-on

Continue to discuss the relevance of CWMD as a Tier 1

JP – FP FCB

Tier 1 – Comment 22

Critical / JS J8

Recommendation: Modify definition of "Joint Protection" - Change "lethal and non-lethal" to "kinetic and non-kinetic" The Joint Force will achieve this through the tailored selection and application of multi-layered, active and passive, lethal and non-lethal, offensive and defensive measures, within all domains, across the range of military operations….

Rationale: Lethal and non-lethal are effects and kinetic and non-kinetic are means. This paragraph is addressing means.

Pros / Cons

Pros: Protection JFC review scheduled to begin Jun 06.

Cons: Is not consistent with the approved Protection JFC.

JCA OPR Position – Defer

Keep currently approved definition pending results of the Protection Joint Functional Concept re-write. Submitter Concurs.

Follow-on

Present to the Protection JFC for consideration during the upcoming re-write of the Protect Joint Functional Concept.

JNCO – NC FCB

Tier 2 – Comment 83

Critical / JS J6

Recommendation: Add the tier 2 term and definition: "Network Management - The ability to provide the network with the desired level of quality, agility, and trustworthiness. Network Management focuses on the configuration, availability, performance, and manageability of network services and the underlying physical assets that provide end-user services, as well as connectivity to enterprise application services. (Derived from Joint Concept of Ops for GIG NetOps)"

Rationale: Adds the term to reflect the framework developed during writing of the NCOE JIC v1.0, which incorporated aspects of the Joint Concept of Ops for GIG NetOps, dated 10 Aug 2005.

Pros / Cons

Pros:

- Writing of NCOE JIC, along with AARs, IPLs, and other issues brought before the FCB, raised the need to formally describe network management as it supports JNO
- One of three pillars for the NCOE JIC
- Added as binning category for latest set of IPLs and ACTDs

Cons: None

JCA OPR Position – Accept

Network Management was designated as the sixth pillar of the Net-Centric Operational Environment JIC, v1.0.

Follow-on

None

JNCO – NC FCB

Tier 2 – Comment 84

Critical / EUCOM

Recommendation: Need to better accommodate Spectrum Assurance. Add following new Tier 2 JCA under Tier 1 Joint Net-Centric Operations:

Rationale: Current edition of lexicon doesn't properly account for EM Spectrum Access. This is a multidiscipline area and needs to stand alone.

Pros / Cons

Pros: Would provide more visibility to spectrum shortfalls

Cons:

- Already binned under new network management Tier 2. (Previously binned under Enterprise Management.)
- Would necessitate the raising of many other "tier 3s" as tier 2s, further complicating binning decisions

JCA OPR Position – Reject

Spectrum management is recognized as a critical aspect of JNCO, but as a sub Tier 2 capability under network management. It is heavily referenced in the NCOE JIC v1.0 under the central idea and in detail under the network management section, to include the task "Ensure spectrum availability". Arguably, spectrum availability is the greatest current and future challenge in enabling JNO.

Follow-on

None

JNCO – NC FCB

Tier 2 – Comments 85, 86

Critical / Army

Recommendation: Tier 1 and 2s should more closely align with the GIG Enterprise Services Strategy. Make only 3 tier 2 JCAs. Put all NCES areas in tier 2 "Enterprise Services" and change tier 2s "Information Transport" and "Knowledge Sharing" to "GIG Network" and "Domain/COI capabilities, services".

Rationale: Info Transport appears to be the GIG Network, IA and Apps are actually listed as Enterprise Services; KS appears to be the Domain/COI capabilities and services as depicted in the NCES Strategy.

Pros / Cons

Pros: None

Cons:

- Current alignment reflects today's NCOE
- The use of (now) six tier 2s better facilitates capability binning for JCIDS and other department efforts, which the JCAs inform

JCA OPR Position – Reject

Realignment considered during NCOE JIC writing. It was decided to keep the separation until NCES matures past the camp/post/station orientation of Increment I. Challenge is not only the long-term GIG maturity but, the short and mid term support to first tactical mile users, of which the NCOE CBA is addressing. Once the CBA is completed,

Follow-on

None

JBA – BA FCB

Tier 2 – Comment 167

Critical / Army

Intelligence Preparation of the Environment

Recommendation: Change "environment" to "battlespace" in lines 313 and 316.

Rationale: Revert to the approved JP 2-01 term. There is no strong justification to make this cosmetic change. The original definition in the draft JCA Lexicon (and the JP 2-01 definition) states the Intelligence Preparation of the Environment involves the enemy, the environment, and the terrain. This analytical methodology therefore involves more than just the environment; to rename it IPE is not accurate or necessary.

Recommendation has strong support both pro and con.

Pros / Cons

Pros:

- Approved use of term from JP 2-01
- IPB more accurately describes current understanding of JBA

Cons:

- Intelligence Preparation of the Environment is a term gaining increased acceptance

JCA OPR Position – Accept

Follow-on

None

JBA – BA FCB

Tier 2 – Comment 168

Critical / Army

Operational Intelligence and Targeting Intelligence

Recommendation: Define operational intelligence and targeting intelligence separately.

Rationale: There is no valid justification to combine these two terms. The requirements for intelligence that supports the planning and conducting of a campaign are very different than those for targeting efforts. This combination of terms implies that campaign planning and execution is primarily based on targeting: a false assertion. Additionally, this section defines targeting—it does not offer a definition for targeting intelligence.

Pros / Cons

Pros:

- Operational and Targeting Intelligence are separate concepts
- Operational Intelligence is a broader term and supports targeting

Cons: Combining terms does link the key aspect of Targeting with Operational Intelligence in support of a campaign

JCA OPR Position – Accept

Acceptance of recommendation reduces confusion

Follow-on

None

JBA – BA FCB

Tier 2 – Comment 169

Critical / Army

Predictive Analysis

Recommendation: Change to read: Predictive Intelligence – intelligence that determines the enemy's intent and anticipates future enemy actions based on its capabilities.

Rationale: The original definition in the JCA Lexicon has two shortcomings. First, it claims to define "predictive analysis," but then offers a definition for "predictive intelligence." Analysis and intelligence are not synonyms. Secondly, it is not enough to predict an enemy's location and enemy commander's intent—also critical are the enemy force's capabilities and actions.

Pros / Cons

Pros: Recommendation clarifies mismatch predictive analysis and predictive intelligenc

Cons: **None**

JCA OPR Position – Accept

Acceptance of recommendation clarifies term

Follow-on

None

JBA – BA FCB

Tier 2 – Comments 171, 172

Critical / Army

Recommendation: Include “Information” as a domain under “Observation and Collection (All Domains)” and Insert: Informational: Collection of the multiple sources or transmission paths for communications, data, or information – including news media.

Rationale: Information operations are an increasingly important dimension of warfighting. Moreover, cyberspace, and other aspects of the information domain, are not necessarily comprehended by the other listed domains and Information operations are an increasingly important dimension of warfighting. Moreover, cyberspace, and other aspects of the information domain, are not necessarily comprehended by the other listed domains.

Pros / Cons

Pros: Information concern covered in Lexicon:
“The ability to use sensors in order to detect
and monitor both physical and non-physical
objects and events in all domains…cyber
and information…” p 5

Cons: None – Information is already included in Tier 2 definition

JCA OPR Position – Reject

Lexicon covers information in “Observation and Collection (All Domains)” definition

Follow-on

None

JC2 – C2 FCB

Tier 2 – Comments 196, 197

Critical / Army

Recommendation: Add "Develop (Theater) Strategy" as a sub Tier 2 element under Exercise Command Leadership

Rationale: Recent experience in Iraq and Afghanistan (CFC-A) reflected strategic planning at the JTF level (focus of the JIC/JCA). JP 1.02's definition of strategy includes developing and employing instruments of national power to achieve theater objectives.

Pros / Cons

Pros: Experience during OEF / OIF revealed strategic planning is a requirement at the JTF level.

Cons: Pieces of the Strategic Planning Capability are covered in different areas of the C2 JCA and JIC. JCA/JIC language is not theater specific – covers more options.

JCA Recommendation – Accept

Add "Develop Strategy" as a sub Tier 2 under Exercise Command Leadership. Draw from JP 1-02 and JP1 for the associated lexicon.

Follow-on

None

JC2 – C2 FCB

Tier 2 – Comment 282

Critical / Navy

Recommendation: Review all JCAs to ensure they meet SECDEF / Tank-approved Tier 1 & 2 criteria/definitions. Revise JC2, JFG & JFM JCA structures to identify Tier 2s that can be delegated, executed, analyzed, or specifically supported by DoD systems & programs.

Rationale: Navy attempts to utilize JCAs for analytical and planning purposes have excluded parts of JC2 because, as currently structured, JC2 JCAs do not lend themselves to execution, delegation, analysis or programming. JC2 operational art and leadership functions can largely be supported by training programs within JFG & the JT FCB.

Pros / Cons

Pros: Would align JCAs with existing systems and/or programs (also a con since JCAs are intended to be capability, not existing program or system specific).

Cons:

- Potential impact to several JCAs
- C2 CBA process validating JIC content as JTF Commander Capabilities

JCA Recommendation – Accept

Per OPNAV recommendation, review/modify lexicon wording for exercise command leadership

Follow-on

None

JPAO – FM FCB

Tier 1 – Comment 52

Critical / JFCOM

Recommendation: Change to read: “The ability to plan, coordinate and synchronize U.S. military public information activities and resources in order to support the commander’s operational and strategic objectives through the communication of truthful, timely and factual unclassified information about joint military activities within the area of operation (AO) to foreign, domestic, and internal audiences to support the commander’s operational and strategic objectives. This capability to includes advising the commander on the effects of public information activities on operations. (Derived from JP 3-61)

Rationale: 1) Vertical and horizontal integration or coordination of information planning is a current challenge and key aspect of this capability. 2) Truth is a very subjective measure. Dealing with facts-knowledge or information based on real occurrences – is a more realistic and quantifiable standard3) Movement of “support objectives” phrase and breaking the definition up into two sentences makes it more concise and simplifies the sentence structure.

Pros / Cons

Pros: More succinct definition

Cons: None

JCA OPR Position – Accept

Concurrence gained through adjudication with the entire PA community.

Follow-on

None

JPAO – FM FCB

Tier 1 – Comment 52

Proposed Definition

The ability to plan coordinate and synchronize U.S. military public information activities and resources in order to support the commander's operational and strategic objectives through the communication of timely and factual unclassified information about joint military activities within the area of operation (AO) to foreign, domestic, and internal audiences. This capability includes advising the commander of the impact of operations and operational decisions on foreign, domestic, and internal audiences and public information activities.

JPAO – FM FCB

Tier 2 – Comments 145, 156

Critical / JFCOM Substantive / Navy

Recommendation: #145 - Change to read: Analytic Support and Assessment - The ability to collect, analyze, fuse and assess information pertaining to target audience analysis, foreign public opinion polling, media analysis, public opinion analysis, identifying sources of influence, mapping the media environment, measures of effectiveness, perception management, human factors analysis, and cultural/societal analysis in order to achieve a holistic assessment of the information environment and support Strategic Communication activities
#156 - Change ". . . fuse and assess . . ." to ". . . fuse, assess and disseminate . . ."

Rational: Public Affairs needs to conduct communication assessment and analysis, but should leverage the more encompassing "Analytic Support and Assessment" by coordinating requirements and using shared products.

Pros / Cons

Pros: More encompassing capability – avoids duplication/redundancy

Cons: None

JCA OPR Position – Partially Accept

- #145 and #156 recommend adding verbiage to expand the scope of "Analytic Support and Assessment"
- Coordination with JS J5 yielded acceptance of verbiage highlighted in proposed definition
- "Strategic Information and Engagement" verbiage deferred based on resolution by JS J5 and DASD (IC) on comment #144

Follow-on

None

JPAO – FM FCB Tier 2 – Comments 145, 156

Proposed Definition

The ability to collect, analyze, fuse, assess, and disseminate information pertaining to target audience analysis, foreign public opinion polling, media analysis, public opinion analysis, identifying sources of influence, mapping the media environment, measures of effectiveness, perception management, human factors analysis, and cultural/societal analysis in order to achieve a holistic assessment of the information environment and support Strategic Communication activities.

JPAO – FM FCB Tier 2 – Comments 155, (166), 162

Critical / JFCOM Substantive / Navy

Recommendation: #162 - Delete "Communication Assessment and Analysis" blue box and replace with "Analytic Support and Assessment" white block.
#155 and #166 (Duplicate of 155) - Eliminate Communication Assessment & Evaluation as a Tier 2 capability. Include AS&A on the JPA Ops chart as a Tier 2 JCA Supported by another Tier 1 JCA

Rationale: Public Affairs needs to conduct communication assessment and analysis, but should leverage the more encompassing "Analytic Support and Assessment" by coordinating requirements and using shared products.

Pros / Cons

Pros: More encompassing capability – avoids duplication/redundancy

Cons: None

JCA OPR Position – Accept

- Concur with replacement of current Tier 2 "Communication Assessment and Evaluation" with reworded "Analytic Support and assessment owned by Joint Shaping

Follow-on

None

JPAO – FM FCB

Tier 2 – Comment 160

Critical / JFCOM

Recommendation: Change to read: "Community Relations – The ability to plan and synchronize programs to enhance interaction and communication among U.S. Joint Forces, and select domestic and foreign stakeholders throughout all operational phases to support commanders' strategic and operational objectives."
Rationale: Community relations programs are not restricted to coalition partners and host nations. These programs should be characterized as targeted toward key "stakeholders," rather than "populations."

Pros / Cons

Pros: More completely defines target audie

Cons: None

JCA OPR Position – Accept

Concurrence gained through adjudication with the entire PA community.

Follow-on

None

JS – FM FCB

Tier 2 – Comment 143

Critical / JFCOM

Confusing and possibly misunderstood capability definition."

Recommendation: Change to read: "This ability can include public information activities as well as information operations [consisting of multi-media programs such as websites, radio, print, and television] to assist selected host nations and the Department of State in reaching foreign target audiences through communication channels such as websites, radio, print, and television."

Rationale: Current wording seems to indicate that only IO has multi-media capability. Public information activities can employ the same methods and usually are the method of first ~~choice when shaping operations are directed at~~ broad audiences.

Pros / Cons

Pros: Added Accuracy

Cons:

- Matter of semantics
- Portion of rationale with regard to DSPD is not J5's assessment.

JCA OPR Position – Accept

Makes sense, provides added clarity

Follow-on

None

JS – FM FCB

Tier 2 – Comment 144

Critical / JFCOM

Recommendation: Replace entire definition with Strategic Communication definition from QDR.

Rationale: QDR definition is more succinct and encompassing

Pros / Cons

Pros:

- Uses most current definition
- Can include SC as a stand alone definition

Cons: Captures only a portion of the activities/scope intended of SIEC

JCA OPR Position – Accept

- Aligns with current SC definition in QDR

Follow-on

None

JS – FM FCB

Tier 2 – Comment 145

Critical / JFCOM

Recommendation: Change to read: Analytic Support and Assessment - The ability to collect, analyze, fuse and assess information pertaining to target audience analysis, foreign public opinion polling, [foreign] media analysis, [foreign] public opinion analysis, identifying sources of influence, mapping the media environment, measures of effectiveness, perception management, human factors analysis, and cultural/societal analysis in order to achieve a holistic assessment of the information environment and support [strategic information and engagement] strategic communication activities.

Rationale: Analytical Support and Analysis should not be limited to foreign audiences. Monitoring and evaluating all media coverage and public opinion (not conducting polling in the US but analysis of polling data) both domestic and foreign is key to assessing the effectiveness of joint shaping operations.

Pros / Cons

Pros: Clarifies need for both domestic and foreign analysis.

Cons: SIEC at least implies operational considerations.

JCA QPR Position – Accept

Follow-on

None

JS – FM FCB

Tier 2 – Comment 148

Substantive / JS J5

Recommendation: Add Threat Reduction Cooperation as a Tier 2 JCA. Define as "Activities undertaken with the consent and cooperation of host nation authorities to enhance physical security, and to reduce, dismantle, redirect, and/or improve protection of a State's existing WMD program, stockpiles, and capabilities. (Derived from Draft NMS-CWMD)"

Rationale: Threat Reduction Cooperation is included as one of the 8 mission areas in the draft NMS-CWMD. It is an important part of USG nonproliferation efforts and is cooperative in nature and fits more clearly under Joint Shaping.

Pros / Cons

Pros: Supports NMS-CWMD

Cons:
- Adds additional Tier 2 JCA
- Requires clarification between proliferation/counter proliferation and threat reduction

JCA OPR Position – Partially Accept

- Currently a tier 2 under Joint Protection
- Add as a white box to JS JCA

Follow-on

None

JFM – FM FCB (Involves JFG) Tier 2 – Comment 127

Critical / Army

Recommendation: Subordinate "Exercise" to "Global Force Management" within Joint Force Management instead of its current position under the "Develop Skills" portion of Joint Force Generation.

Rationale: Exercises address a specific situation or contingency, and are therefore more appropriate to Joint Force Management, the focus of which is to ready capabilities for specific contingencies. This would also allow greater coherence between Joint Force Management and the Army Force Generation Model.

Pros / Cons

Pros: None

Cons:
- Will confuse the line between JFG and JFM.
- Opens door to combine JFG and JFM into a large cumbersome JCA.

JCA (CO-)OPR Position – Reject

JFG was designed as a "build the force" JCA providing trained forces and equipment to JFM who are the "manage the force" JCA and provide tailored forces and equipment to the other JCAs. JCAs were designed as a common language to be used across DOD as a whole and matching JCAs with specific Services would detract from the overall intent.

Follow-on

None

JFM – FM FCB

Tier 1 – Comment 50

Critical / Army

Recommendation: Change to read:
The ability to integrate existing and future human and technical assets from across the Joint Force to make the right capabilities available at the right time and place.

Rationale: It is unnecessary to state why the capabilities are required, only that that they are needed. Again, the National Defense Strategy is a broad document that does not comprehensively articulate either the specific kinds or degree of capabilities required. Such requirements are addressed by the JSCP, but the JSCP does not necessarily cover unforeseen contingencies.

Pros / Cons

Pros: Cleaner definition

Cons:

- Current definition already approved
- Matches FM JFC

JCA OPR Position – Reject

Definition as written matches the definition in the FM Joint Functional Concept as approved by the JROC.

Follow-on

None

JFM – FM FCB

Tier 2 – Comment 128

Critical / Army

Recommendation: Substitute phrase "U.S. military capabilities" for U.S. conventional military forces.

Rationale: U.S. military capabilities extend beyond conventional operating forces. They also include special operating forces, defense agencies, and the institutional capabilities of DoD components, aka the Generating Force.

Pros / Cons

Pros:

- Is a reasonable change to definition.
- Uses the term capabilities instead of forces – something the department is trying to get organizations to do.

Cons: GFM definition has been approved. Making a change to the JCA would conflict with definition approved in GFM Document.

JCA OPR Position – Partially Accept

The definition of GFM has been approved by SecDef as written in the GFM Document, dated 4 May 05. The correct term is U. S. military capability. Additionally the phrase "insights into" should be used instead of "visibility of" within the same sentence.

Follow-on

None

JFG – JT FCB

Tier 1 – Comment 43

Critical / Army

Recommendation: Rewrite the JFG description starting with “The ability of DOD to develop capabilities required by Joint Force Commanders in order to…”

Rationale: JFG is about developing capabilities and should include all elements that comprise a capability across the DOTMLPF.

Pros / Cons

Pros: Highlights JFG’s role in developing the capability.

Cons:
- Minimal value added.
- Difficult to understand intent; too wordy.

JCA OPR Position – Reject

JFG is identified as “the ability to…” not the “ability to develop capabilities…” “The ability to…” is a more direct and better action description. Additionally, JFG is already understood to be a needed capability area since it is a JCA so there is no need to repeat that in the description.

Follow-on

None

JFG – JT FCB

Tier 2 – Comment 98

Critical / EUCOM

Recommendation: Incorporate "sustain the force" in either the Force Management or Force Generation JCAs. Sustaining the force goes hand in hand with manning/recruiting.

Rationale: Current JCA process is not conducive in identifying indirect mission supporting priorities (e.g. quality of life programs) which help sustain the force and support manning/recruiting.

Pros / Cons

Pros: Highlights important need to address "quality of life" issues.

Cons:
- Previously address at resolution conferences but not documented.
- Including will open door to plethora of lower tier issues inherent to the particular JCA.

JCA OPR Position – Defer

IAW previous JCA resolution conferences, "sustaining the force" already falls under a lower JFM tier capability based on the JCA philosophy of JFG "building the force" and JFM "managing the force."

Follow-on

Defer pending additional cross-FCB (JFM) OPR discussions.

JFG – JT FCB

Tier 2 – Comment 99

Critical / CENTCOM

Recommendation: Joint Training is not identified as a Joint Capability Area. Include Joint Training as a Joint Capability Area.

Rationale: There are two schools of thought with regard to Joint Training. 1) The capability to conduct Joint Training cuts across all joint capability areas and therefore should not be a separate area. 2) Since the NMS, DPG and the Joint Command Plan all make reference to establishing a Joint National Training Capability, Joint Training should be a separate JCA. Including Joint Training as a JCA maintains alignment of JCAs with Functional Capability Board areas.

Pros / Cons

Pros: Highlight Joint Training as an essential capability.

Cons: Including will open door to a plethora of other subordinate tier issues

JCA OPR Position – Reject

Joint Training falls under JFG/Develop Skills. It was not spelled out specifically because JCAs were designed as a common language to be used across DOD as a whole and JFG was designed to include Joint Training, in the macro sense. Specific Joint Training issues could fall under any JCA.

Follow-on

None

JIINC – JT FCB

Tier 1 – Comment 45

Critical / Army

Recommendation: Rewrite the JIINC description to read; “The ability to effectively coordinate between elements of the Department of Defense and other entities, to include engaged U.S. government agencies, multinational partners, supported host nation governments, international organizations, intergovernmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations, for the purpose of accomplishing a specific objective.”

Rationale: Including all such areas of potential coordination in JIINC’s domain would lend greater coherence, and better support its management as a Joint Capabilities Portfolio.

Pros / Cons

Pros: Adds specificity

Cons:

- Run risk of leaving out an agency/element.
- Increases misinterpretation by becoming wordy.

JCA OPR Position – Reject

Definition was reflected to ensure simplicity and flexibility. Adding specifics such as “to include…” runs the risk of misinterpretation and/or leaving out critical agencies/organizations.

Follow-on

None

JIINC – JT FCB

Tier 2 – Comment 117

Critical / JS J8

Recommendation: Rewrite this definition.

Rationale: As written it is the definition of US Government Interagency Integration. The published definition says nothing about state/local government.

Pros / Cons

Pros: None

Cons: No suggested definition given

JCA OPR Position – Reject

Recommendation does not include a suggested rewrite, therefore current definition will be used.

Follow-on

None

JIINC – JT FCB

Tier 2 – Comment 118

Critical / ASD (NII)

Recommendation: Need to include Host Nation (HN) Agencies and Members of the Private Sector in the Tier 2 Taxonomy and Lexicon definitions as part of the Joint Interagency/IGO/NGO Coordination Level 1 JCA.

Rationale: Current directives include need for information sharing and coordination with foreign nation/HN and security forces/agencies and include requirement for information sharing and coordination with members of the Private Sector for SSTR operations.

Pros / Cons

Pros: Better spell out inclusive agency types

Cons:
- Loss of definition flexibility.
- My exclude agencies.
- Agency list may exceed space.

JCA OPR Position – Reject

Definitions are intentionally written as generic in order to maintain flexibility and not to inadvertently exclude agencies. Recommended agencies should be considered included.

Follow-on

None

JIINC – JT FCB

Tier 2 – Comment 119

Critical / Army

Recommendation: Include Tier 2 JCA, Synchronize Operations with mission partners and other agencies, as a Tier 2 JCA supported by another Tier 1 JCA.

Rationale: Would better support a Joint capabilities portfolio dedicated to developing DoD capabilities for coordinating with external agencies.

Pros / Cons

Pros: None

Cons:

- No significant value added in adding another tier II
- Adds confusion

JCA OPR Position – Reject

Synchronizing operations is inherent within Joint Interagency/IGO/NGO Coordination.

Follow-on

None

All

Tier 1 – Comment 55

Critical / PACOM

Recommendation: Update lexicon with coordinated draft Joint Pubs and other resources. This lexicon is dated 24 Aug 05 and appears to be based on early 05 references.

Rationale: Update lexicon to current information including draft documents that have been vetted across DoD once and do not have critical comments associated with the specific reference used.

Pros / Cons

Pros: Maintains JCA lexicon currency

Cons: None

CA Coordinator Position – Partially Accept

JCA OPRs are updating references as appropriate using the JCAMP refinement process.

Follow-on

None

J-7

Tier 1 – Comment 59, 60

Critical / Navy

Recommendation: Remove column of table with Functional, Operational, Institutional and Domain JCAs, and remove associated definitions from JCAMP.

Rationale: While delineation of the four areas makes sense in the isolated language of the JCAMP, when these areas are assigned to particular JCAs in the Tier 1 JCA Table, inconsistencies result.

Pros / Cons

Pros:

- Utility in categorizing the JCAs is starting to surface…i.e.. UJTL mapping may not apply to the institutional JCAs
- Some stake-holders like the construct…

"The design of the JCA construct into four JCA types…is both comprehensive and flexible." (JFCOM J9 JPP)

Cons: None

JCA Coordinator Position – Defer

Follow-on

JCAMP writing team investigate, at a minimum, establishing consistency within JCA categories

All

Tier 2 – Comment 281

Critical / OSD AT&L

Recommendation: Little to no consideration of coalition planning and international cooperation in the definition or role of the JCAs. There should be a Tier 2 capability following each of the Tier 1 JCAs that should support this national objective. This is especially important in the domain JCAs as well as those relating to C2 and Network integration.

Rationale: From the National Defense Strategy, Strategic Objectives…Strengthen alliances and partnerships. We will expand the community of nations that share principles and interests with us.

Pros / Cons

Pros: None

Cons: Proliferation of white boxes

JCA Coordinator Position – Reject

JS, JC2, JPAO, & JL JCAs have tier 2 JCAs that specifically address coalition members wrt, relationships, collaboration, capabilities, planning and alliances in their associated lexicon. It is unnecessary to repeat these in all Tier 1 JCAs…however that option is available to JCA OPRs.

Follow-on

None

JS – FM FCB

Tier 2 – Comment #154

Critical / Navy (Delete Tier 2)

Recommendation: Eliminate Strategic Information & Engagement Coordination (SIEC) as a Tier 2 JCA.

Rational: While coordination and deconfliction among the disciplines identified in the description of SIEC to achieve desire effects is essential, it does not rise to the level of creating a separate capability to perform those tasks. The capability to engage in the process of that coordination and deconfliction should already be resident in each of those Tier 1 and 2 capabilities. Many other Tier 1 and 2 capabilities have similar relationships requiring coordination and deconfliction, but a separate capability is not required to perform that function.

Pros / Cons

Pros:

- Strategic Information and Engagement Coordination is a process, not a capability.
- Capability to engage in the process of coordination and deconfliction should already be resident in existing Tier 1 & 2 capabilities, i.e. IPA, IO, DSPD, etc.

Cons:

- Joint Shaping supports inclusion of "Strategic Information and Engagement Coordination" as a Tier 2 capability.

JCA OPR Position – Reject

- Concur with related comments #144 and #161 to change SIEC to "Strategic Communication" (SC) and include the QDR definition of SC in the lexicon.

Follow-on

Unresolved, requires Flag/SES level adjudication